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Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush
Neal Devins*
I. INTRODUCTION
What can Presidents do? A recent spate of books and articles
suggest that Presidents should not simply manage -the administra-
tive state but should forcefully advance a vision of governmental
authority and policy. Former Reagan Administrbation officials Doug-
las Krniec and Terry Eastland, for example, speak of presidential
power as being "best defined by the strength of presidential will"1
and assert that a great President "will definitely risk his political
future ... [and] is not one that hoards popularity for the sake of
reelection."' This perception, that Presidents must lead, is shared
by liberals and conservatives alike.
"The vision thing," according to the now popular wisdom,
.explains the downfall of former-President George Bush. Instead of
someone who embraced a notion of good government, Bush has
been described as "amiable and aimless,"s "'less interested in do-
ing anything special as president than in just being president,'" 4 a
man who "often talks not about his convictions on difficult issues,
but about how he wants to be 'positioned."'5 For this reason,
Bush was unceremoniously savaged by all sides. He was accused of
being "a wimp" by Newsweek;6  "pretty, petulant, and
unpresidential" by Time correspondents Michael Duffy and Dan
Goodgame; 7 and of "undermin[ing] his own popularity" by Wash-
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks
to Phil Runkel for exceptional research assistance on the 1991 Civil Rights Act and to
Jan Thomas and Scott Zimmerman for valuable seminar papers on the 1990 Civil Rights
Act. I am also indebted to Nelson Lund for his piercing commentary on an earlier draft
of the Article. All mistakes are my own.
1 DOUGLAS W. KMIEc, THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S LAwYER 47 (1992).
2 TERRY EAsnAND, ENERGY IN THE ExECuTIVE 306 (1992).
3 MICHAEL DuFFY & DAN GOODGAME, MARCHING IN PLACE (1992).
4 Jonathan Yardley, The Amiable Mister Bush, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 9, 1992, at BW3
(book review quoting Duffy and Goodgame).
5 DustY & GOODGAME, supra note 3, at 89.
6 Id at 38.
7 Robert J. Samuesson, The New Nixon, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 5, 1992, at A23.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ington Post columnist Robert Samuelson.' If anything, the
President's harshest criticisms came from the right. George Will
called Bush a "lap dog;"' Irving Kristol warned that "[i]deological
conservatives are simply tired of winning Presidential elections
while remaining powerless to shape the future;"1 and Wall Street
Journal editor Robert Bartley described Bush as the antithesis of an
agent of change." In an obituary to Bush's presidency, Republi-
can speechwriter Peggy Noonan put it this way: "Serious people in
public life stand for things and fight for them; the ensuing strug-
gle is meant to yield progress and improvement. Mr. Bush seemed
embarrassed to believe. It left those who felt sympathy for him
embarrassed to support him." 2
The civil rights area, particularly Bush's signing of the 1991
Civil Rights Act, is often singled out as a prime example of Bush's
inability to lead. His posturing on the Act has been labelled the
"biggest straddle" of his presidency, prompting the Washington Post,
New York Times, and Time magazine to undertake news analyses of
White House disarray.' Conservatives and Republicans also
joined this chorus. Clint Bolick thought Bush "bereft of a true
moral compass on civil rights;" 4 Chester E. Finn, Jr. spoke of the
absence of "vigorous, principled leadership on this increasingly
bitter front;"15 and Eddie Mahe spoke of the necessity of the
White House to "stop the hemorrhaging with this disarray, this
lack of planning, this lack of thought, this lack of vision, this lack
of coherency." 6 Civil rights leaders, such as William Coleman
and Vernon Jordan, also saw the 1991 Act as a "flat out repudia-
tion of the administration's longstanding position." 7
8 Id
9 Paul Berman, Sound and Fuiy: The Washington Punditocray and the Collapse of Ameri-
can Politic, NEW REPUBLiC, Nov. 23, 1992, at 43 (quoting George Will).
10 Irving Kristol, The State of Disunion, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at D17.
11 Robert Bartley, Mugwumps Battle Know-Nothings for GOP's Future, WALL ST. J., Feb.
13, 1992, at A18.
12 Peggy Noonan, Why Bush Failed N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A35.
13 See Maureen Dowd, White House Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al; Dan
Goodgame, The White House: Nervous and Nasty, TIME, Dec. 2, 1991, at 18; Ruth Marcus,
What Does Bush Really Believe?: Civil Rights Issue Illustrates Shifts, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1992,
at Al.
14 See Marcus, supra note 13, at Al.
15 Chester E. Finn, Jr., Quotas and the Bush Administration, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1991,
at 17, 23.
16 See Dowd, supra note 13, at Al.
17 William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the Civil Rights Bill was Re-
ally Passed, WASH. POsT, Nov. 18, 1991, at A21.
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This portrayal of the Bush presidency as unfocused, rudder-
less, and reactive is persuasive. The invocation of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act as exemplary of Bush's failings, however, goes too far.
Although hardly bereft of the occasional flip-flop or policy indirec-
tion, the President stood more firmly on the 1991 Act than on
any other civil rights matter. On the question of employment dis-
crimination lawsuits grounded in numerical imbalance (disparate
impact), for example, the White House withstood several opportu-
nities to capitulate before compromising its position in the face of
a possible veto override.
Why then is the President's signing of the 1991 Act typically
viewed as an outright policy reversal? The answer is that Bush's
obvious lack of policy preferences on civil rights created a culture
of failed presidential leadership. In other words, by persistently
refusing to play a leadership role on civil rights, Bush's steadfast-
ness on the 1991 Act did not fit a pattern and was readily dis-
missed. Along these lines, the concessions that the White House
won from congressional leaders are at once significant and easily
ignored.
This Article will recast Bush's role in the shaping of the 1991
Act. However, it will not defend Bush's effectiveness as a civil
rights policymaker, a role in which he demonstrated little leader-
ship. He provided no direction himself, nor did his appointees
speak in a single voice. Civil rights policyrnaking was instead dis-
cordant and often self-contradictory. Rather than be engulfed in
the civil rights fires which consumed much of the Reagan adminis-
tration, Bush settled on a distinctively nonideological approach
toward civil rights. His civil rights strategy was consistently reactive
and utilitarian. The White House never played a leading role in
initiating civil rights reform; when forced to act, it sought either
to maximize political advantage or to minimize political loss. That
this cost-benefit analysis often led to erratic policymaking was a
price the Bush administration clearly was willing to pay.
The failed leadership of the Bush White House is hardly a
plea for a return to the leadership styles of supposedly ideological-
ly pure visionaries such as Ronald Reagan. The Reagan administra-
tion also floundered in its efforts to reshape civil rights dialogue.
Indeed, the Bush White House was correct in seeking to avoid
some of the pitfalls which beset its predecessor. Bush, however,
learned the wrong lessons from Reagan. Rather than sorting out
how a President could advance his agenda in the face of an unre-
1993]
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ceptive Congress, Bush simply abandoned civil rights as an issue
that mattered to his presidency.
This Article will examine the nexus between and the lessons
to be learned from Reagan and Bush approaches to civil rights.
Part II will assess the Reagan administration to highlight the diffi-
culties of White House centralization of civil rights. The discussion
will also call attention to the limits of confrontational reform strat-
egies, such as those embraced by the Reagan Justice Department,
and the potential of incremental bureaucratic reforms, such as
those embraced by the Reagan Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"). Part III will consider how the Bush White
House responded to Reagan's civil rights legacy. Specifically, rather
than be heartened by the prospects of bureaucratic reform, the
Bush White House apparently dwelled on the costs of confronta-
tional approaches. The outcome was a strategy of issue avoidance.
Part IV will examine Bush's management of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act. This examination will also contrast presidential authority to
shape legislative content with presidential authority over imple-
mentation. Part V will offer a brief summary of the Article's find-
ings.
II. THE LESSONS OF RONALD REAGAN1
8
The reaches and limits of White House civil rights efforts can
be seen in Reagan's efforts to centralize civil rights policy. Reagan
took office at the height of federal efforts to impose numerical
measures of equality. During the Carter years, existing programs,
such as Executive Order 11,246 r6quirements for federal, contrac-
tors and Small Business Administration ("SBA") incentives for
minority entrepreneurs, were strengthened; numerous race and
gender-conscious initiatives were launched throughout federal
departments and agencies.'9 Reagan ran on a platform which
made opposition to these Carter initiatives a centerpiece of his
campaign, arguing that "equal opportunity should not be jeopar-
dized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions which rely on
quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to exclude some indi-
18 Portions of this Part are adapted from Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89
lcH. L REv. 1723, 1749-63 (1991).
19 See generally HERMAN BELz, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER CENTURY OF AFFiR-
MATIVE AcTION (1991); Chester E. Finn, Jr., "Affirmative Action" Under Reagan, COMMEN-
TARY, Apr. 1982, at 17, 18-20.
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viduals in favor of others, thereby rendering such regulations and
decisions inherently discriminatory."2°
The manner in which Reagan sought to change these pro-
grams, however, belied his campaign rhetoric. Some programs
were challenged, others left alone, and a few even defended. This
lack of clarity evidences real limits in White House centralization
efforts. 2' First, federal civil rights enforcement sweeps throughout
the executive branch; hence, effective White House coordination is
almost impossible. Unless a President makes civil right enforce-
ment the benchmark of his administration, discontinuity seems
unavoidable. Second, once a law is enacted and the initial imple-
menting regulations promulgated, it is extraordinarily difficult to
reconsider en masse the enforcement schemes of prior administra-
tions. Oversight committee and constituency interest opposition is
simply too formidable here. Consequently, secondary devices such
as reorganization and policy prioritization-which do not directly
attack existing regulations-are often the best mechanism for
change available to the White House. Admittedly, reliance on such
secondary devices limits a President's civil rights legacy, for succes-
sor administrations can easily reset priorities and reorganize agen-
cies. Nonetheless, during the Reagan years, entities such as the
EEOC, which relied on secondary devices, advanced their agenda
far more effectively than those such as the Justice Department,
which launched frontal assaults against existing programs. Indeed,
when Reagan left the White House, the entire scheme of bureau-
cratic regulations and decisions attacked by candidate Ronald
Reagan withstood Justice Department efforts to actualize this cam-
paign promise.'
20 1980 Republican Platform, nprinted in 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 50-B, 62-B (1980).
Contra 1980 Democratic Platform, rerinted in 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 91-B, 105-B (1980)
("[Ain effective affirmative action program in an essential component of our commitment
to expanding civil rights protections."). Reagan, moreover, did not change his rhetoric
once in office.
21 Curiously, one of the best demonstrations that the President is powerful but not
omnipotent is that Reagan civil rights policy came under attack from both the left and
the right. From the right, Jeremy Rabkin, pointing to the administration's support of
numerous affirmative action programs, accused the Reagan administration of "wring[ing]
what[ever] partisan advantage it can from the pattern of racial and ethnic spoils estab-
lished in the 1970s." Jeremy Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBUC, Aug. 5, 1985,
at 15, 17. From the left, the civil rights community issued numerous reports condemning
the administration record as "absolutely deplorable," straining the relationship between
the national government and black America. Finn, supra note 19, at 17.
22 See BELz, supra note 19, at 181-207; Rabkin, supra note 21; EASTLAND, supra note
2 at 178-89.
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A. The Improbability of Centralization
Every government agency, department, and commission is in
the business of civil rights enforcement. Title VI requirements
prohibiting nondiscrimination in federal assistance are enforced by
all government agencies distributing federal largess; EEOC regula-
tions call for sensitivity by all government agencies to numerical
equality objectives in their own hiring. Moreover, freestanding civil
rights enforcement projects exist within the EEOC, SBA, Federal
Communications Commission, Civil Rights Commission, the Legal
Services Corporation, and the Departments of Energy, Treasury,
Labor, Education, Commerce, Transportation, and Justice. Given
the pervasiveness of civil rights enforcement, centralization can
occur only if the White House both makes coordination a primary
objective and is extremely diligent in appointing to key govern-
ment posts individuals who agree with the President's views on
civil rights enforcement. Otherwise, competing regulatory agenda
items will take precedence over civil rights enforcement and,
correlatively, external pressures from oversight committees and
constituency interests will dilute the White House agenda.
Reagan White House civil rights centralization efforts clearly
suffered from internal and external coordination problems. Inter-
nal problems derived from the existence of several competing
strategies of regulatory relief within the executive branch. The
most visible strategy-commonly associated with the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") in general and Civil Rights Division head William
Bradford Reynolds in particular-was moralistic and rhetorically
divisive. It viewed preferential treatment "based on nothing more
than personal characteristics of race or gender ... as Oust as]
offensive to standards of human decency today as it was some 84
years ago when countenanced under Pessy v. Ferguson."" It was
also confrontational, calling for immediate and massive judicial,
regulatory, and legislative reform.
The willingness of DOJ to launch a frontal assault on numeri-
cal proofs of discrimination and nonvictim relief is unique, howev-
23 Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, 1981:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and La-
bor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 137 (1981) (citation omitted) (statement of William
Bradford Reynolds); see also William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The
Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 998-1001 (1984) (individual rights best protected
through race-neutral means).
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er. The preferred strategy of other civil rights enforcement agen-
cies was to leave existing programs on the books but to limit the
effectiveness of those programs through a variety of enforcement
strategies. Furthermore, agencies not principally in the business of
civil rights enforcement-even if sympathetic to the DOJ's moral
imperative-focused their attentions on other regulatory initiatives.
Finally, at least with respect to minority business enterprise pro-
grams housed in the SBA as well as the Departments of Transpor-
tation and Commerce, the Reagan administration and its appoint-
ees favored some of the affirmative action initiatives launched by
Presidents Nixon and Carter.
2 4
These varied strategies ensured a certain degree of disunity in
Reagan civil rights policies. Ironically, this disunity can be ex-
plained, in part, by efforts towards White House centralization.
Most significant, "movement conservatives" at DOJ and the White
House saw themselves in the midst of a holy war that required
uniform adherence to the Justice. creed. As caricatured by former
Education Secretary T.H. Bell, these "extremists" would say: "Let
the chaos come .... This is part of the revolution! Pragmatism is
cowardice and weaknessl "' In the end, however, this absolutist
approach undermined any chance of effective White House cen-
tralization.
The keys to this failure are three extraordinary policy blun-
ders made by the President at the urging of the DOJ. First,
Reagan's ostensible commitment to simple nondiscrimination was
called into question when his administration sought in 1982 to
restore the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private
schools."6 Second, in the midst of this fiasco, Reagan announced
his opposition to provisions of the 1982 Voting Rights Act
amendments which make disparate racial impact an important
evidentiary tool in voting rights casesY In explaining the
administration's position, a "hearing room full of civil-rights activ-
24 See Robert Pear, Administration Challenges Plan by Rights Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
1986, at Al.
25 Terrel H. Bell, Education Policy Development in the Reagan Administration, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, Mar. 1986, at 487, 491; see also TERREL H. BELL, THE THIRTEENTH MAN 99-113
(1988).
26 Treasury Sets New Policy on Tax-Exempts, Allers Position on Private Schools, Daily Exec.
Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at G-3 (Jan. 8, 1982). See generally Jeremy A. Rabkin, Taxing Discimi-
nation. Federal Regulation of Private Education by the Internal Revenue Service, in PUBLIC VAL-
UES, PRIVATE ScHoOLs 133 (Neal Devins ed., 1989).
27 The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b
(1988).
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ists erupted into laughter" when Attorney General Smith remarked
that "the President doesn't have a discriminatory bone in his
body."2' Third, in 1983, President Reagan (unsuccessfully) sought
to remove Mary Frances Berry and two of her colleagues from the
allegedly "independent, bipartisan" United States Commission on
Civil Rights.' In their stead, Reagan advanced three nominees
who, according to Reagan, "don't worship at the altar of forced
busing and mandatory quotas" and "don't believe you can remedy
past discrimination by mandating new discrimination." ° Although
he had good reason to be fed up with the Commission's partisan
attacks on his administration,"1 Reagan's efforts here, as Senator
Edward Kennedy put it, appeared to be "an unprecedented assault
on the independence and integrity of the Civil Rights Commis-
sion."32
This assault on the Commission, along with Reagan's efforts
to grant tax breaks to discriminatory private schools, limit voting
rights reform, and enable the DOJ to launch a frontal assault on
preferential hiring, came at a significant political cost. The Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights, for example, cast Reagan as a
villain, arguing that "power and prejudice" rather than
"fairmindedness and fidelity to law" "hold sway" in his adminis-
tration." Pragmatists within the administration thought it politi-
cally unwise for the White House itself to expend further political
capital in this area. Furthermore, Reagan appointees at other
agencies witnessed and learned from these events that confronta-
tional politics came at a high cost. Consequently, although the
DQJ persisted in its frontal assault upon race-conscious affirmative
action, neither the White House nor other agencies assisted them.
The failure of the Reagan White House to centralize civil
rights enforcement is not surprising. Despite Reagan's alleged
ideological vision and his attempts to centralize government regu-
28 Finn, supra note 19, at 27.
29 See George Lardner Jr., 3 on Rights Commission 'Terminated' by Reagan, WASH. POST,
Oct. 26, 1983, at A2.
30 See Juan Williams, Reagans Offers Defense on Rights Record, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
1983, at 1.
31 See Finn, supra note 19, at 24-25; Chester E. Finn, Jr., From Civil Rights to Special
Intemts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,-1983, at 32.
32 See Presidential Nominations to the Civil Rights Commission. Hearings on the Nominations
of Morris B. Abram, John A. Bunze Robert A. Destro, and Linda Chavez Before the Comm. on
the Judidary of the Senaie, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1983) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy).
33 LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITHoUT JusTicE 75 (1982).
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lation, numerous internal and external pressures undermined a
coordinated civil rights enforcement strategy. Some of these pres-
sures are endemic to all administrations. For example, the inevita-
bly divergent interests of government agencies and departments
had previously doomed Johnson, Kennedy, and Carter administra-
tion efforts at interagency coordination.' However, some of the
problems the Reagan administration faced were unique unto it. A
highly ideological group of "movement conservatives," Reagan's
reliance on delegating authority to like-minded individuals to ac-
complish centralization objectives, and the simple fact that the
Reagan administration was butting heads with mainstream civil
rights interests were circumstances peculiar to the Reagan adminis-
tration.
That the Reagan administration did not speak with one voice
highlights the difficulty of coordinating civil rights policy in the
modern administrative state. That difficulty, however, does not
mean that the White House is without substantial power in this
area.
B. Bureaucratic v. Confrontational Approaches to
Alter Regulatory Policymaking
The Reagan experiment tells a very revealing story about the
limits of agency power to modify existing regulatory structures.
Direct repeal of existing interpretations and regulations is unlikely
to succeed. Indirect attacks launched through agency reorganiza-
tion and policy prioritization are far more likely to succeed. The
Reagan experience reveals that civil rights politics is the "art of
the possible." Although DOJ efforts to change the face of civil
rights were a highly visible political failure, that failure, in many
respects, was one of politics, not ideology. At the EEOC, Chairman
Clarence Thomas proved remarkably adept at advancing many of
the same goals that made the DOJ the subject of public ridicule.
An administration must recognize both its potential, as well as
its limitations. The repudiation of well-entrenched civil rights pro-
grams comes at a high political cost. Bitter confrontations with
Congress, often resulting in the enactment of program-saving legis-
lation, is a likely outcome of such direct challenges. The Reagan
34 See HUGH DAVIs GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 44, 64 (1990) (Kennedy admin-
istration); id at 181-84, 192 (Johnson administration); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1977 331 (1977) (Carter administra-
tion).
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DOJ bears this out. In sharp contrast, little political capital is ex-
pended in displacing disfavored policy through indirect tech-
niques. The Thomas EEOC was a master at such policymaking. By
shifting scarce agency resources from disfavored to preferred poli-
cy objectives, the agency proved adept at making policy inroads
while eschewing counterproductive toe to toe battles with Con-
gress.
Remarkably, while avoiding such battles, Clarence Thomas was
an outspoken critic of race and gender preferences."5 Indeed, in
explaining initiatives which shifted agency resources away from
group-conscious programs, Thomas spoke in one breath about the
costs of affirmative action and the virtues of individual-centered
relief. Ideology and political strategy then operated in tandem at
the Thomas EEOC; Thomas both spoke and acted on an individu-
alistic agenda. In sharp contrast, the Reynolds DOJ offered no
constructive alternative. Its attacks on group relief were not coun-
terbalanced by reform initiatives.
A comparison between the Thomas EEOC and the Reynolds
DOJ reveals that an administration can advance a modest civil
rights agenda inconsistent with legislative preferences without suf-
fering devastating political costs.' To the extent that Bush's inco-
herent civil rights policies were rooted in the prohibitive costs of
such an agenda, the Thomas EEOC serves as a telling counter-
example.
35 He told Congress that "numerically based remedies which focus on sex, race or
ethnic considerations have the potential to undermine the ultimate goals of nondiscrim-
ination." Policies Regarding Goals and Timetables in Litigation Remedies: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings]. He also said that the 1978 guidelines
"assume some inherent inferiority of blacks, hispanics, other minorities, and women, by
suggesting that they should not be held to the same standards as other people." Juan
Williams, A Question of Fairness, ATLANTIc, Feb. 1987, at 70. Furthermore, statistical proofs
of discrimination fail to recognize "cultural differences .... education levels, commuting
patterns, and other 'previous events'" that help explain disparities. I& at 73.
36 The comparison between the DOJ and the EEOC is a fair one despite the many
structural differences between these two entities. Admittedly, the bulk of DOJ
policymaking is a by-product of adversarial litigation, not bureaucratic enforcement. At
the same time, the most visible failures of the Reagan DOJ are tied to legislative and
regulatory initiatives that the DOJ advocated before the White House and federal agen-
cies. Moreover, like the DOJ, the EEOC-which lacks cease and desist authority-typically
advances its policy objectives through litigation.
(Vol. 68:955
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER BUSH.
1. The EEOC
The Thomas EEOC, at first glance, seems hardly a model of
successful policymaking. Although it had voiced objections to both
affirmative action remedies and numerical measures of discrimina-
tion contained in the agency's 1978 Uniform Guidelines, the
Thomas EEOC never formally modified pre-existing Carter EEOC
regulations. 7 In fact, Thomas explicitly endorsed the use of goals
and timetables, despite his personal objections, at Senate reconfir-
mation hearings.' Moreover, on several occasions, the EEOC
locked horns with DOJ on the numerical equality issue.39 Finally,
despite the Office of Management and Budget's ("OMB") request
that the agency undertake a cost efficiency review of the 1978
guidelines,' the EEOC balked-apparently because the political
costs of revision were too high.
This reluctance to repudiate existing policies, however,
masked the massive changes which took place at the EEOC. Indi-
rect attacks launched through resource prioritization, reorganiza-
tion, and an unwillingness to adopt new theories that might ex-
pand agency jurisdiction proved the mechanism of reform at the
agency. At this game, the EEOC proved hugely successful.
Thomas, rather than rescind Carter initiatives, replaced this
regime with enforcement strategies that sought relief for identifi-
able victims of discrimination. In September 1984, the agency
announced it would place greater emphasis on litigation to secure
redress for employment discrimination.41 In February 1985, the
EEOC issued a policy statement which made clear that its pursuit
of this litigation strategy would "eradicat[e] discrimination in the
37 Alternatively, the Thomas EEOC should instruct a liberal President how to ad-
vance his civil rights agenda when confronted with a conservative Congress.
38 See ag., Nomination of Clarence Thomas, of Missouri, to be Chairman of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commissio= Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1986).
39 These disputes concerned the DOJ's representation of the EEOC before the Su-
preme Court, intervention in lower federal court cases in which the EEOC was a party,
and refusal to comply with EEOC affirmative action guidelines for federal agencies and
departments. For overview critiques, see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVL RiGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCE-
MENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS 40-42 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 CRC RE-
PORT].
40 See Felicity Barringer, Job Bias Debate is Reopened, WAsH. Posr, Aug. 14, 1981, at
A27; 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 39, at 24.
41 Statement of Enforcement Policy, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § III, at GC:3003 (Sept.
11, 1984).
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workplace" by providing relief for identified victims of discrimina-
tion.42 Placing such emphasis on individual make-whole relief
made fewer resources available to pursue class action cases (whose
remedies often included goals, timetables, and quotas). 4
Correlatively, this new emphasis on "certainty and predictability in
enforcement and the securing of full remedial, curative and pre-
ventive relief" brought with it the demise of a rapid charge system
focusing on quick settlements of individual complaints." At the
same time, class action litigation was not eliminated, but simply
reduced (from sixty-seven percent to thirty-five percent of all
nonsubpoena cases).' However, the substance of class 'action
awards did change dramatically. By focusing on individual victims
within a class, the EEOC typically rejected goals and timetables in
favor of backpay awards.' In a related development, the EEOC
retooled its office in charge of so-called "systemic" discrimination
lawsuits. Rather than using statistical proofs and targeting large
employers such as AT&T and Sears, Thomas modified both the
scope and sweep of the systemic effort by focusing on smaller
employers and making use of on-site investigations.
While shifting the focus of EEOC activities, Thomas did not
rest his case on the rhetorical arguments that lay at the heart of
the DOJ's campaign against race preferences. Instead, he took an
affirmative stance, arguing that the shift to an individual-centered
approach would place greater pressure on employers to eradicate
discriminatory practices. 47 Thomas also defended backpay and
other individual make-whole relief as an effective deterrent to
employment discrimination. Unlike goals and timetables, which
42 Poliy Statement on Remedies and Relief for Individual Cases of Unlawful Disaimination,
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § III, at GC:3005 (Feb. 5, 1985).
43 Williams, supra note 35, at 70, 80.
44 See EEOC, EEOC's NEW CHARGE PROCESSING APPROACH 2 (1984). By eschewing
administrative conciliation in favor of a more scrutinizing examination of employee com-
plaints, the Thomas EEOC dismissed twice as many (roughly 56%) of its cases as without
merit. Hearings, supra note 35, at 193, 211 (report of Women's Employment Institute).
45 See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 39, at 38.
46 In fact, by narrowly reading Supreme Court decisions which approved of numeri-
cal remedies, the EEOC could find that circumstances in which preferential relief was on
the table were virtually nonexistent. For example, during the period from October 1985
to July 1986, the EEOC did not approve a single case in which goals and timetables were
"an issue." Id.
47 Systemic litigation rooted in statistical proofs, in contrast, was depicted as a costly
failure. For example, in a systemic suit involving Sears, not only did the court accuse the
agency of "present[ing] no credible evidence," but the case's costs were so great as to
threaten an agency-wide staff furlough at one point. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628
F. Supp. 1264, 1802 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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shifted the cost from employers to those neither hired nor pro-
moted, backpay awards came directly from employers' pockets.
Resource prioritization, which enabled the EEOC to displace
problematic programs grounded in numerical proofs and classwide
relief with preferred individual-oriented programs, proved the most
significant mechanism for reform at the EEOC. The EEOC also
accomplished change through two other nonconfrontational devic-
es: agency reorganization and policymaking through the agency's
stated refusal to discover new "vistas" of the law.
The ostensible purposes of agency reorganizations are to
"maximize efficiency and economy, promote effective planning and
coordination, reduce program fragmentation and overlap, elimi-
nate unnecessary paperwork, and increase accountability.' Reor-
ganizations, however, also enable political appointees to maintain
greater control over their operations by staffing newly created
offices with a cadre of trustworthy individuals. Through the cre-
ation of an Office of Legal Counsel charged with interagency
coordination and the drafting, of regulations, political appointees
at the EEOC displaced careerists in controlling policy develop-
ment.49 The agency also made effective use of a reorganization
by transferring systemic litigation from a separate office to political
appointees within the Office of General Counsel, while moving
systemic compliance to the newly structured Office of Program
Operations.5
The EEOC, moreover, proved adept at policymiking through
inaction, that is, refusing to adopt reform initiatives. During the
Reagan years, for example, the agency rejected comparable worth
as a mechanism of determining job discrimination under Title VII,
declined to extend Title VII to professional certification and li-
censing, and refused to adopt regulations extending the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act to apprenticeship programs.51
The significance of these refusals, while not altering the status quo
ante, are profound. Witness the comparable worth decision. The
Thomas EEOC flatly rejected, as "[without] statutory basis or case
48 GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FiX, REUEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY Di-
LEMMA 156 (1984).
49 See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 39, at 18-19.
50 Id.
51 EEOC Decision No. 85-80, 1985 EEOC LEXIS 19 (July 12, 1985) (comparable worth
decision); EEOC Decision No. 87-2, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6869 (Aug. 31, 1987);
Sedede Statements Delivered Januay 28, 1988, to the House Seet Comm. on Aging, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 19,.at E-1 (Jan. 28, 1988).
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law support," equalizing the salaries of jobs held predominantly by
women and the salaries of "comparable" jobs held predominantly
by men.52 In stark contrast, the Carter EEOC had seemed ready
to endorse this concept. In 1979, Eleanor Holmes Norton, chair-
man of the Carter EEOC, endorsed comparable worth,' later
calling it the "cutting edge" labor issue of the 1980s because it
addressed "the deepest, least-touched levels of discrimination. "5
EEOC policymaking through resource prioritization, reorgani-
zation, and inaction transformed the agency during Thomas' ten-
ure. Thomas' success here is largely attributable to his
policymaking strategy. Costly political battles associated with the
repeal of existing regulations were rejected in favor of indirect
techniques of resource prioritization, reorganization, and inaction.
In other words, rather than launch an attack on civil rights con-
stituencies and their friends on congressional oversight commit-
tees, Thomas proved skillful at working within a political culture.
Ultimately, the 1978 Affirmative Action Guidelines stayed in
place despite White House pressures and an internal agency re-
view. Race and gender goals and timetables were never formally
examined. In fact, after Acting General Counsel Johnny Butler's
oral instruction to staff attorneys not to include goals in new set-
tlements caused an uproar in 1986, the EEOC formally endorsed
goals and timetables.5 In addition, over the objections of the
DOJ, the EEOC continued to require that federal agencies submit
to affirmative action plans.56 Finally, Thomas appealed the
EEOC's defeat in Sears and other systemic cases because if he
hadn't "the liberals would be all over me."57 This acquiescence to
the Carter legacy led civil rights groups such as the National Ur-
ban League and NOW to admit at Thomas' 1986 reconfirmation
hearings that "given this administration's record [we] have no
illusions that a nominee committed to strong enforcement would
replace [Thomas]. " s
52 EEOC Decision No. 85-80, supra note 51, at *9.
53 Carol Krucoff, Money: The Question of Men, Women and "Comparable Worth," WASH.
POST, Nov. 13, 1979, at B5.
54 CWA Conference Addresses Issue of Comparable Worth in Public Sector, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 50, at A-5 (March 14, 1984).
55 Back to Hiring Goals, TIME, Aug. 4, 1986, at 29.
56 Williams, supra note 35, at 76.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 77.
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Congressional action mirrored this begrudging acceptance of.
Thomas. While disapproving of the EEOC's displacement of class-
wide strategies, the agency's shift from one legitimate policy objec-
tive to another did not raise legislative ire to the retaliation point.
Congress simply could not repudiate Thomas' stated "intent to
pursue quality investigation of charges, to make victims whole and
to ensure that injustices are corrected not repeated." 9 Moreover,,
Thomas' arguments regarding the effectiveness of backpay and
other make-whole remedies could not be rejected as either far
fetched or mean spirited. Finally, since budgetary constraints re-
sulted in the loss of more than fifty attorneys, EEOC attention to
identifiable victims of discrimination necessarily resulted in de-
creasing attention elsewhere. Put simply: Thomas, by making a
sound case for his policy initiatives, effectively put Congress on the
defensive for failing to allocate adequate funding to the agency.
60
2. The Failure of Confrontational Strategies
The EEOC's success stands in marked contrast to the failures
of the DOJ, the FCC, and the Civil Rights Commission. These
agencies' efforts to repeal existing programs pushed Congress past
the brink. Congress, for example, used its confirmation power to
punish individuals within the administration who spearheaded
confrontational operations-most notably Brad Reynolds whose
appointment to the Associate Attorney General position at DOJ
was turned down.6 ' Furthermore, FCC efforts to rescind the
granting of preferences to minority broadcasters were greeted by
the enactment of single year funding restrictions forbidding such
reconsideration. 2 This direct challenge to existing rulemaking,
combined with the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, "so
poisoned relations between the two entities that it stimulated con-
59 Id. at 74..
60 Indeed, as Norman Amaker concluded in an Urban Institute study otherwise criti-
cal of Reagan civil rights: -rhe interpretation of the data [on the EEOC] ultimately de-
pends on one's perspective of what is important for the agency to do-a matter of em-
phasis." NORMAN AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN.ADMINISTRATION 110 (1988).
61 See James R. Dickinson, Running Scared in Pennsylvania: Sen. Spectre Aims to Suwie
in Democratic Teritoy, WASH. POST, July 6, 1985, at A4; Paul Duke, Senate Panel Reects
Reagan Nominee for Associate Attorney General Post, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1985, at AS;
Howard Kurtz, Rynold's Nomination Voted Down, WASH. POST, June 28, 1985 at Al.
62 See generally Neal Devins, Congress, the FC, and the Search for the Public Truste, LAW
& CONTEMP. P1iOBS. (forthcoming fall 1993).
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gressional oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is
unprecedented.' a
Congress used its power of the purse in other ways to correct
agencies which disregarded their past legislative preferences. This
was the fate suffered by the Civil Rights Commission and its con-
troversial chairman, Clarence Pendelton. The Commission was
unwilling to play ball with Congress and so Congress subjected it
to an extensive General Accounting Office ("GAO") audit, severely
reduced its appropriations, directed it to pursue specified research
priorities, and ordered it to allocate its appropriations internally
according to a restrictive legislative formula (including limitations
on travel and staff support for Pendelton).4
The most visible failure of confrontational politics and the
most vivid contrast to the EEOC, however, is the Department of
Justice. Justice was aggressive in challenging-on both statutory
and constitutional grounds-the legality of race and gender prefer-
ences, arguing that affirmative action was "at war with the Ameri-
can ideal of equal opportunity for each person to achieve whatev-
er his or her industry and talents warrant.'" s In court, DOJ ef-
forts proved a mixed success.' Most significantly, efforts to en-
tirely discredit race and sex preferences clearly failed. During
Reynolds' tenure, the Supreme Court validated a range of hiring
and promotion schemes that benefitted nonvictims. In several of
these cases, moreover, the Supreme Court rebuked the DOJ for
departing from past governmental efforts that had supported affir-
mative action. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court
barred state-sponsored nonremedial set-asides and layoffs of senior
nonminority employees.
Outside of court, DOJ efforts to reshape federal affirmative
action policy proved an unabashed disaster. Its positions on tax
breaks for discriminatory schools and voting rights brought noth-
ing but embarrassment and ridicule; its objections to the Civil
Rights Restoration Act led Congress to override a presidential
63 Micomanagement of the FCQ Here to Stay, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56.
64 See David Brock, Politicizing the Government's Watchdog, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1986, at
A22; Howard Kurtz, Hill Slashes Funding for Rights Panel, WASH. PoST, Oct. 19, 1986, at
A12.
65 See Mary Thornton, Reagan, Aide Differ on Hiring Poliy, WASH. PosT, Dec. 1981, at
As (quoting William Bradford Reynolds, head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department).
66 See generaly Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan 68 TEX. L REV. 353
(1989); Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but the
Shouting, 86 MICH. L REv. 524 (1987).
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veto;67 and its efforts to relitigate fifty-one affirmative action con-
sent decrees involving state and municipal government provoked a
rift between the DOJ and the states (as well as a series of striking
defeats in court).' These failures, however, pale by comparison
to the defeat the DOJ suffered within the executive branch.
Reagan appointees at other agencies witnessed and learned
from the DOJ that confrontational politics come at a high cost.
For example, Clarence Thomas, recognizing that Justice "blew it"
politically with its "negative agenda,"' opposed DOJ intervention
in EEOC litigation as well as Justice's refusal to comply with EEOC
affirmative action guidelines.7" Furthermore, the White House
often discounted DOJ initiatives as too politically risky. Take the
case of Justice's failed efforts to modify Executive Order 11,246
programs-requiring 325,000 government contractors to adopt
affirmative action plans.71 Pragmatists within the administration
like Labor Secretary Bill Brock thought it "politically crazy" for the
White House to expend further political capital in this area. Don-
ald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury during the tax exemption
controversy and later Chief of Staff, agreed. As Brad Reynolds
came to recognize, "Bob Jones was Don Regan's tar baby and he
was not about to have another such fiasco."' Ironically, as a re-
sult of this campaign, the Reagan administration reinstated Carter-
era enforcement policies that it had earlier abandoned, thereby
strengthening the executive order program.
73
The political failures of the DOJ, moreover, cannot now be
justified as an acceptable short-term cost to change the face of
civil rights policymaking. Reynolds' confrontational strategy was
easily depicted as a civil rights retreat. The Bob Jones fiasco, the
firing of politically incorrect Civil Rights Commissioners, and the
attempt to run rough shod over state and local government by
challenging pre-existing settlement agreements made it easy to cast
67 Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987 and Transmitting Alternative Legislation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 345 (Mar. 16, 1988)
(veto message); see also. 124 CONG. REC. H1072, S2765 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (over-
ride); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1687 (1988)).
68 See Schwartz, supra note 66, at 525-26.
69 Williams, supra note 35, at 80.
70 See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 39.
71 For an insightful recount of this episode, see Gary L McDowell, Affirmative Inac-
tio,,, POL REV., Spring 1989, at 32.
72 Id. at 35.
73 rd. at 33.
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Reynolds as villain. As such, Reynolds was hard pressed to gain the
upper hand in the battle over group preferences.
Justice's efforts to impose its imprimatur on Reagan civil
rights enforcement undermined a more modest and potentially
successful approach. Recurring enforcement strategies of the Rea-
gan administration generally eschewed repudiation of existing
programs in favor of, as George Eads and Michael Fix observed,
"adoption of a new and more exclusive screening criteria for iden-
tifying potential violators; unwillingness to test new legal or eco-
nomic theories that might expand the existing classes of violators;
[and] reduced discretion for field enforcement personnel."7' This
more modest approach would have been less subject to political
attack and, consequently, might well have withstood oversight
committee and constituency group pressure. That is the very les-
son of the Reagan EEOC-an agency which followed this model.
The Reagan experiment tells a very revealing story about the
limits of agency power to modify existing regulatory structures.
Once a law is enacted and the initial implementing regulations
promulgated, it is extraordinarily difficult to reconsider en masse
the enforcement schemes of prior administrations. Oversight com-
mittees and constituency interest opposition is simply too formida-
ble at this point. Direct repeal of existing interpretations and
regulations therefore is unlikely to succeed. These roadblocks,
however, do not foreclose White House influences. Instead, they
deny presidential supremacy and force an administration to sup-
plement traditional policymaking through rulemaking with back-
door policymaking devices like appointments, agency reorganiza-.
tion, and resource prioritization. Although such policymaking
devices are necessarily temporary (for subsequent administrations
can exercise the powers of appointment, resource prioritization,
and reorganization to displace their predecessors' objectives), these
devices play quite a large role in civil rights enforcement.
The Reagan years then tell a cautionary tale about executive
power. Implementation strategies with modest objectives can move
agency policymaking in the direction of administration priorities.
However, once constituency and congressional expectations are
well settled, efforts to replace existing approaches with a new
regime will meet tremendous resistance. Since Congress holds the
ultimate trump card with, among other things, its power of the
purse, direct attacks such as those launched by the FCC, the Civil
74 EADs & Fix, supra note 48, at 193-94.
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Rights Commission, and especially the DOJ seem doomed to fail-
ure. Consequently, after the enactment of legislation and promul-
gation of initial agency regulations and interpretations, executive
power lies principally at the margins. As such, White House cen-
tralization efforts cannot rewrite the nation's civil rights agenda.
Furthermore, only a jerry-rigged structure can be assembled with
the tools of executive power-appointments, reorganization, policy
prioritization-and hence it is unlikely that a President will be
able to establish a civil rights legacy.
However, these limits on executive power should not be over-
stated. Clarence Thomas nullified a great deal of Carter era nu-
merical equality initiatives. Although the ephemeral nature of
Thomas' weapons for reform makes his legacy vulnerable, the
Reagan EEOC is a testament to the fact that an agency willing to
swim against the political current nonetheless possesses substantial
power.
III. GEORGE BUSH'S CIL RIGHTS AGENDA
The lessons of the Reagan era were lost to the Bush presiden-
cy. Rather than follow "in the tradition of Ronald Reagan,"75 as
the 1988 Republican platform promised, .the Bush administration
sought to distance itself from its predecessor. Had Bush-like Bill
Clinton-disagreed with Reagan's rhetorical attack against prefer-
ences, such distancing would undoubtedly have been appropriate.
Moreover, had Bush taken issue with the confrontational style of
some of the Reagan officials, changes in executive political strate-
gies too would be expected. An argument, I suppose, can be made
that differences between the Reagan and Bush approaches to civil
rights reflect such differences in personal philosophy and leader-
ship style. These differences, however, are rooted in Bush's ab-
sence of vision rather than his endorsement of a competing vision.
Bush officials saw civil rights as a special interest mine
field-better avoided than navigated. The negative publicity gar-
nished by, and ultimate ineffectiveness of, the confrontational
Reagan administration approaches likely figured in this calculation.
That these controversies would dwarf the bureaucratic strategies
advanced at the EEOC and elsewhere also comes as no surprise.
Vice-President George Bush was directly involved in these Reagan-
75 1988 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAc 2369, 2399
(1988).
1993]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
era civil rights disputes, often advocating a position at odds with
the ideologically driven Justice Department.76 The day to day
management of the EEOC, in contrast, was an unlikely target to
appear on the radar screen of Bush or his staff.
Reagan-era controversies tell only part of the story. Bush nev-
er saw himself as either an ideological warrior or a keeper of the
Reaganesque flame. His approach to domestic policymaking, as has
been countlessly recounted in the wake of his 1992 electoral de-
feat, was reactive issue-avoidance.
Civil rights appears a model of Bush's lack of commitment
and vision. The story begins well before 1988. From 1963 to 1970,
when Bush served in the House of Representatives and ran for
Senate, his civil rights perspectives varied to meet the needs of the
prevailing political winds." Bush opposed the 1964 Civil Rights
Act because it "was passed to protect 14 percent of the people.
I'm also worried about the other 86 percent." He likewise opposed
open housing legislation in 1966, saying that there were "[already]
wonderful alternatives in the field of housing ... .", Bush, how-
ever, vigorously supported fair housing legislation in 1968 and
affirmative action in federal contracting in 1970.7' The explana-
tion for these inconsistencies-in a statement attributed to
Bush-was that "I needed to get elected."' ° Jefferson Morley put
a kinder-but nonetheless devastating-spin on Bush's civil rights
record, namely, "George Bush isn't merely caught in the middle
of this conflict [between Republican moderates and conserva-
tives]-he embodies it."81
The Bush presidency clearly reveals that the past is prologue.
Rather than stand for something (even rhetorically if not in fact),
Bush sought to conciliate civil rights interests without alienating
conservatives. This mish mash approach to policymaking, although
intended to be risk adverse, ultimately proved disastrous. By the
end of his presidency, neither civil rights groups nor conservatives
shed tears at Bush's electoral defeat. Unlike Clarence Thomas,
who consistently advocated individual-centered approaches
and-while dodging policy initiatives he deemed politically coun-
76 See Marcus, supra note 13, at Al.
77 See Jefferson Morley, Bush and the Blacks: An Unknown Stoy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan.
16, 1992, at 19-26.
78 Marcus, supra note 13, at A20.
79 See id.; Morley, supra note 77, at 24-25.
80 Marcus, supra note 13, at A20.
81 Morley, supra note 77, at 26.
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ter-productive--put his advocacy into action, Bush's civil rights
strategy was inherently discordant and therefore carried little favor
with any constituency.
Bush's willingness to break faith with his predecessor is most
vividly revealed in his handling of the Civil Rights Commission
and the FCC, two entities that were immersed in Reagan-era con-
troversy. At the Civil Rights Commission, Bush appointees and key
agency personnel disavowed the Reagan Commission's assertion
that affirmative action "merely constitutes another form of unjusti-
fied discrimination ... [and] offends the Constitutional principle
of equal protection."' Bush's choice for .chairman, Arthur Fletch-
er, a personal friend of the President who also was a long time
proponent of race-conscious hiring, perceived that "specifying the
number of person-hours to be worked by minorities and women"
as "typical contracting practice" and not a "quota."' Another
Bush appointee, Charles Pei Wang, supported efforts by Actor's
Equity to prevent a white actor from playing a Eurasian role in
the Broadway production of "Miss Saigon.""' In addition to these
appointments, staffers hired by the Reagan administration were
dismissed so that the new leadership could "select staff with whom
it has personal confidence to carry out its policy goals."8
These changes at the Commission were intended to demon-
strate to the civil rights community dramatic differences between
the Bush and Reagan presidencies. Bush wanted to tilt the balance
of the Commission back again, so that-in the words of presiden-
tial spokesman Marlin, Fitzwater-it "could be stronger and more
forceful in representing the concerns of minorities" than its prede-
cessor.8
Here, rather than avoid his predecessor's mistakes, Bush affir-
matively sought to distance himself from Reagan by returning the
Commission to its past glory. At a White House ceremony honor-
ing the newly constituted commission, Bush-borrowing a phrase
from Senator Kennedy--spoke approvingly of the agency's historic
role as "an independent, bipartisan voice for justice."87 By em-
82 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RGHTS, TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF S7o77s 54 (1985).
83 Arthur A. Fletcher, For Civil Rights, It's Back to the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1990, at D19.
84 See Press Release, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Aug. 10, 1990.
85 Letter from Wilfredo Gonzalez, Staff Director of the Commission on Civil Rights,
to Brian D. Miller, Deputy General Counsel (June 12, 1990) (copy on file with author).
86 James Gerstenzag, Bush Names Fltcher to Head Rights Panel LA. TIMEs, Feb. 24,
1990, at A18.
87 Remarks at a Meeting With the Comm'n on Civil Rights, 1 PuB. PAPERS 675 (May
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bracing this characterization, Mr. Bush proved willing to shoot
arrows at his predecessor. Ironically, when the President sought to
moderate the Civil Rights Act of 1990, Commission Chairman
Fletcher expressed "outrage" and questioned Bush's sincer[ity]
about civil rights."'
Bush's desire to work with civil rights interests is also revealed
in his management of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs ("OFCCP"), the governmental office which supervises
Executive Order 11,246 compliance. Reagan took heat both for his
management of this office and his willingness to reconsider the
11,246 program. Bush appointees, in contrast, were more active in
enforcing 11,246. In fiscal year 1990, for example, 4,595 contrac-
tors were found to be in violation of OFCCP regula-
tions-prompting 2,855 "conciliation agreements" and 1,700 firms
committing to abide by OFCCP requirements.'
Changes at the FCC were less dramatic but equally telling.
Bush appointed three FCC Commissioners-Alfred Sikes, Sherrie
Marshall, and Andrew Barrett-in the summer of 1989. All three
expressly supported the race preference program repudiated by
their predecessors in their confirmation hearings.' ° Before the
Supreme Court, these appointees turned their words into deeds by
vigorously (and successfully) defending diversity preferences in
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.91
Unlike Civil Rights Commission appointments, it is unlikely
that Bush officials selected the FCC Commissioner in order to re-
verse Reagan-era approaches to civil rights. For the Bush adminis-
tration, telecommunications policy hinged on the re-establishment
of a dialogue between the FCC and Congress. Bush sought to
soothe strained relations in many ways, including his sacrificing of
ideological consistency on affirmative action.
The Metro Broadcasting litigation is telling for another reason.
Before the Supreme Court, Bush appointees in the Justice Depart-
ment took issue with the FCC position. Characterizing these pref-
erences as "racial stereotyping that is anathema to basic constitu-
17, 1990) [hereinafter Remarks].
88 Ann Devroy & Michael Isikoff, Administration Renews Threat to Veto Civil Rights Bill
if Left Unchanged. WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1990, at All.
89 See Finn, supra note 15, at 21.
90 See NominationsJuly: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 341 (1989) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes); id.
at 365 (statement of Andrew Barrett); id. at 380 (statement of Sherrie Marshall).
91 497 U.S. 547 (1990); see Devins, supra note 62.
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tional principles,"92 Solicitor General Kenneth Starr urged the
Court to invalidate the FCC program.
The spectacle of Bush appointees squaring off before the
Supreme Court on a matter as explosive as race preferences ap-
pears bizarre. It is not. FCC appointees needed to satisfy constitu-
encies within Congress. Justice Department officials were not be-
holden to that constituency; instead, the Bush Justice Department,
although unwilling to lead the charge of a civil rights counterrevo-
lution, maintained its allegiance to the individuals and arguments
of its predecessor. In many respects, the DOJ was Bush's calling
card to movement conservatives who figured so prominently in the
Reagan Revolution. To turn his back on that constituency,, by
ordering the Solicitor General to back away from the Metro Broad-
casting case, was unthinkable. The Bush administration was far
more comfortable allowing its appointees to engage in open battle
before the Supreme Court. Rather than being schizophrenic, the
conflicting Court argument of the DQJ and the FCC simply reveal
Bush's desire to assuage opposing constituencies.
Bush's laissez fare attitude towards the DOJ, however, had its
limits. Although willing to let the Department argue against prefer-
ences in court, Bush nonetheless expressed concern over a too
rigid application of this position. On minority set-asides, he -nar-
rowly interpreted the DOJ's Supreme Court victory in City of Rich-
mond v. JA. Croson Co.' and spoke of being "committed to affir-
mative action" and, with it, his desire "to see a reinvigorated Of-
fice of Minority Business in Commerce."' Bush also demonstrat-
ed his support for mainstream civil rights interests by signing an
executive order on historically black colleges and universities," a
cause the President supported since he led the campus drive for
the United Negro College Fund as a college student in 1948. 6
This longstanding support was demonstrated in other ways. When
the Solicitor General filed a brief opposing increased financial
support to black colleges, because such aid may perpetuate segre-
92 Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497
US. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453).
93 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
94 The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 21, 29 (Jan. 27, 1989); sm also
Sharon LaFraniere, On Civil Rights, Bush Aides Let Conservative Crusade Fade, WASH. POsT,
Mar. 18, 1991, at Al.
95 Exec. Order No. 12,677, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,869 (1989), reprinted in 20 U.S.C. 1060
(Supp. I 1991).
96 See Morley, supra note 77.
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gation by encouraging minority enrollment, Bush directed a rever-
sal of that position before the Supreme Court.97 The triggering
event here was a meeting in which black college presidents for-
mally complained to the President about the Solicitor General's
brief 8
Recognition of constituency interests figured prominently in
Bush's dealings with the DOJ, the FCC, and the Civil Rights Com-
mission. These episodes are simply the tip of the iceberg. Interest
balancing also explains Bush's treatment of several other civil
rights issues. Witness Bush's strong backing of the Americans with
Disabilities Act-legislation which both makes use of disparate
impact proofs of discrimination (rooted in numerical imbalance)
and requires state and private employers of fifteen or more to
make "reasonable accommodations" necessary to employ otherwise
qualified people with disabilities.' In supporting this legislation,
Bush distanced himself from Reagan by endorsing a major civil
rights initiative, offended no one, and won favor with an extraordi-
narily powerful constituency of over forty-three million disabled
Americans. Bush has also appealed to this constituency through
his appointments to the EEOC, the agency principally responsible
for writing the implementing regulations for and enforcing the
provisions of this law. Bush's choice for chairman of the EEOC,
Evan Kemp, as well as its chief of staff, Robert Funk, both came
to the agency from disability rights interests groups. 1°
°
Bush's embrace of "reasonable accommodation" demands is
telling."0 ' Although some employers might feel pressure to hire
the disabled simply to avoid litigation and other expenses, Bush
spoke of "equality, independence, and freedom" when he signed
the Disabilities Act.' This message, which is hard to square with
97 See Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1991, at B6.
98 Seeid-
99 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-86, 104 Stat. 327 (cod-
ified in scattered sections of titles 29, 42, 47 of the U.S.C.).
100 See EEOC Chairman-Designate Evan Kemp Wl Bring New Perspective to Civil Rights
Ageny, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at A-4 (Feb. 20, 1990).
101 Unlike Title VII, where statistical based disparate impact proofs are of extraor-
dinary import, ADA plaintiffs might well make limited use of statistical proofs. As EEOC
Chairman Evan Kemp put it: "[A] typical ADA case will involve the question of whether
an individual's disability (which is often relevant) actually prevents him from doing the
job." EEOC Chairman Criticies Danforth Proposal to Link Language of Civil Rights, ADA Act,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-12 (Sept. 24, 1991).
102 Ann Devroy, In Emotion-Filed Ceremony, Bush Signs Rights Law for America's Disabled,
WASH. Posr, July 27, 1990, at A18.
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Bush's subsequent attacks on the 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts,
dramatizes the White House's lack of coherence and control in
civil rights decision making. Rather than advance a unified vision
through its appointments or take steps to coordinate policy decla-
rations in the White House, White House direction typically took
the form of identifying which constituency to serve. Beyond that,
enforcement agencies tended to operate as mini-feifdoms, behold-
en to no one in the executive branch. The Justice Department
and the FCC's battle over race preferences or the DOJ's attack on
historically black colleges in the face of a conflicting executive or-
der fits this pattern.
Bush's approach to civil rights, like Hippocrates, was "do no
harm." By placing the business of civil rights enforcement in the
hands of individuals either a part of (Evan Kemp, Arthur Fletcher)
or not opposed to (FCC appointees, Civil Rights Division head
John Dunne) civil rights interests, Bush sought to separate himself
from the costly controversies that engulfed his predecessor. More-
over, in the event of controversy, Bush typically favored the civil
rights community over his own appointees. His intervention on
behalf of historically black colleges fits this model. A more striking
example of Bush's abandonment of his appointees in favor of
special interests involved Department of Education opposition to
race-designated scholarships.
On December 4, 1990, Michael Williams, the Department of
Education's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, concluded that laws
prohibiting "discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or na-
tional origin" extend to race exclusive scholarships. 103 This ruling
disrupted Education's long-standing practice of authorizing minori-
ty scholarships. In the aftermath of this unexpected announce-
ment, an avalanche of protests from higher education and civil
rights groups flooded both the White House and the Education
Departmen t .L'
Bush's handling of the minority scholarship flap is a prime
example of minimizing political loss. The reasonableness of
Williams' interpretation was irrelevant. The prospect of the Depart-
ment of Education disrupting a longstanding policy of better en-
103 See Letter from Michael L Williams, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to John
Junker, Fiesta Bowl Executive Director (Dec. 4, 1990); U.S. Dep't. of Educ. Press Release,
Dec. 4, 1990.
104 For descriptions of this episode, see EASrLAND, supm note 2, at 284-87; Finn,
supra note 15, at 19-20.
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abling disadvantaged minority youth to attend college offered no
political advantage.
White House sources immediately informed reporters that
Education acted unilaterally and that the President disagreed with
Williams' interpretation. Within a few days of its minority scholar-
ship announcement, the White House minimized potential damage
by forcing Education to adopt a bizarre compromise of disallowing
(after a four year transition period) federal race-specific support
while authorizing all other race-specific designations."0 While
recognizing that race-specific scholarships may run contrary to the
statutory prohibition against recipients of federal financial assis-
tance discriminating "in any program or activity," the President
trivialized this concern as a matter for the "courts to rule on," "for
now... we can continue to have these kinds of scholarships.""°
Lamar Alexander, then Secretary of Education designate, went one
step further.0 7 At his confirmation hearings, he vowed to tempo-
rarily suspend restrictions on race-based scholarships and ex-
pressed regret that the Department of Education had "sent out
exactly the wrong signal .... [to] minorities. " 108
The Bush administration's discounting of subordinate legal
interpretations on the minority scholarship question stands in
sharp contrast to Reagan administration practices. Ronald Reagan
created a firestorm of adverse publicity by defending controversial
DOJ interpretations. Bush, unwilling to be saddled with the bur-
dens that befell his predecessor, quickly distanced himself from his
subordinates.
White House intervention here arguably is more than a politi-
cally expedient policy reversal. After all, as his intervention on be-
half of historically black colleges suggests, Bush may well have
long been committed to enhancing educational opportunities for
minority students through race-exclusive measures. In other words,
Bush may simply have advanced his own understanding of appro-
priate governmental policy in choosing to respond to civil rights
constituencies rather than defend the legal interpretations of his
appointees. Admittedly, like his support of minority set-asides,
these outreach efforts do not jibe with Bush's charge that dispa-
rate impact proofs of discrimination improperly encourage race-
105 See U.S. Dep't. of Educ. Press Release, Dec. 18, 1990.
106 Karen De Witt, U.S Eases Colege Aid Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, at Al.
107 Kenneth J. Cooper, Review of Race-Based SdWlarships Promised, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
1991, at A3.
108 Id.
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conscious hiring. Something else-aside from inconsistencies in
the President's civil rights vision-is at play, however. Bush never
sought to centralize policymaking on this question in the White
House. The Williams interpretation went forward because there
were no established procedures for clearing alterations in execu-
tive policy through the White House. Bush, moreover, failed to
maintain strong Secretary level control at Education. Rather than
quickly replace Education Secretary Lauro Cavazos, a Reagan ap-
pointee described as "hapless" and "notoriously weak,""° Bush
facilitated the circumstances in which an undersecretary could
define executive branch policymaking.
The final resolution of this dispute further reveals Bush's
penchant to leave civil rights policymaking in the hands of ap-
pointees. Rather than keep the minority scholarship issue on ice
(as Bush's endorsement of "these kinds of scholarships" could
suggest), Education proposed regulations in December 1991, speci-
fying that "[a] college may consider race as one factor among
several when awarding scholarships."" 0 Under intense pressure
from Congress, Education again suspended rulemaking on this
issue.11 With Clinton's choice for Education Secretary, Richard
Riley, describing minority scholarships as "valid, good and legal,"
this contentious issue-barring court action-appears put to rest
through a return to the status quo ante.' 2
The minority scholarship flap reinforces how difficult it is to
affect policymaking through confrontational strategies. The Bush
administration understood this, correctly gleaning from the Rea-
gan experience the pitfalls of an overly ideological, overly con-
frontational approach to civil rights. Bush's quick withdrawal from
the Williams' interpretation, while prompting a conservative back-
lash, was understandable and appropriate. In the words of Educa-
tion Secretary Alexander: "I heard once that it's not a good idea
to turn over every rock that you can, and this might have been a
rock that it was best not to turn over."1 Consequently, while
laws prohibiting discrimination by recipients of federal largesse
109 FMinn, supra note 15, at 19; EASMIAND, supra note 2, at 285.
110 Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,548 (1990)
(proposed Dec. 10, 1991). These standards track the Supreme Court's decision in Re-
gents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
111 e Judges Allow RacBased Scholamhips, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1993, at AS.
112 Id.
113 Alexander, Martin Face Clear Sailing for Cabinet Posts, ATLANrA J. & CONST., Feb. 7,
1991, at A2.
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may well forbid race exclusive scholarships, that interpretation is
better left to the courts than to an agency. There is a second
reason to prefer judicial over agency action. Where Congress can
make life miserable for an agency through its oversight powers as
well as its control over an agency's purse strings, Congress' only
response to judicial action is the difficult task of enacting new
legislation.
The Bush White House learned little more from the Reagan
administration than to eschew confrontational repudiations of
long-standing policies. Bush too eschewed the advancement of an
individual-centered civil rights agenda through the bureaucratic
techniques championed by the EEOC. Bush, instead, advanced an
agenda of issue avoidance. Political appointees were not a group
of like-minded individuals seeking to advance some shared vision
of the public good. For the most part, appointees reflected the
interests of the affected constituency.
This appointments strategy, needless to say, made for an inco-
herent civil rights agenda. Bush apparently did not care. Like
Richard Nixon-who simultaneously sought to woo conservatives
through his opposition to school desegregation and to appease the
civil rights community through his support of minority hiring
preferencesn 4 -Bush sought to have it both ways. This brink-
manship, by not displeasing either constituency too much, was de-
signed to keep the President removed from the civil rights fires
that so consumed both the Carter and Reagan administrations.
Along these lines, the Bush White House left it to agency heads to
run their programs. It intervened only when agency level decisions
prompted an outcry from affected interests. Minority scholarships
and historically black colleges are two such examples.
Bush was unable to have it both ways, however. Standing for
something did matter. Events culminating in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 saw liberals and conservatives alike distancing themselves
from Bush. Ironically, while deserving opprobrium for discounting
civil rights, Bush was energetic, involved, and somewhat effective
in shaping this legislative debate.
IV. THE 1991 CMvL RIGHTS AcT
Presidents often play a leadership role in shaping the content
of civil rights legislation. When the White House disagrees with
114 Se gnemlly GRAHAM, supra note 34.
[Vol. 68:955
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER BUSH
the Congress, for example, the formidable task of overriding a
veto encourages compromise. Of course, as was the case with the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the White House may simply serve
as a cheerleader to congressional initiatives. The 1991 Civil Rights
Act was quite another matter, however. From April 3, 1990, less
than two months after the legislation was first introduced, to Octo-
ber 23, 1991, two days before the announcement of a compromise
agreement, the Bush administration steadfastly claimed that it
would veto this behemoth package of civil rights reforms. During
this period, the President once successfully exercised his veto pow-
er and on at least two dozen occasions publicly discussed this
matter.
The principal disagreement between the administration and
Congress concerned disparate impact proofs of discrimination.
Arguing that proofs of employment discrimination sensitive to
numerical imbalance "create a very real risk.., of quotas, ""'
the White House advocated inclusion of stringent evidentiary stan-
dards to dissuade hiring by numbers. Congress and civil rights
leaders, in contrast, endorsed more liberal proofs of discrimina-
tion. An epic struggle was fought over this matter. The stakes were
high and both sides fought tooth and nail for their position.
When a compromise was worked out, however, Bush was widely
accused of capitulating to congressional sponsors. Reflective of
conservative sentiments, Douglas Kmiec claimed that "Bush
flopped, flipped, and ultimately totally flopped over the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. "n11 From the civil rights community, William
Coleman and Vernon Jordan described the compromise as "a flat
out repudiation of the administration's longstanding position."117
Indeed, the President's only defender was his controversial coun-
sel, C. Boyden Gray. "Contrary to a rapidly congealing press
myth," Gray wrote, "the Democrats beat a total retreat on quo-
ta.n118
The truth, as best I can tell, lies somewhere in the middle.
Both sides made concessions and took calculated risks regarding
future judicial interpretations. That Bush wound up with egg on
115 Badround Information and Text of Administration's Civil Rights Bill, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 43, at F-1 (Mar. 5, 1991).
116 KMIEC, supra note 1, at 167.
117 Coleman & Jordan, supra note 17, at A21.
118 C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won, They Capituated, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 1991,
at A23.
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his face simply reflects the widely held (and well founded) belief
that Bush did not believe his anti-quota rhetoric. Like the boy
who cried "wolf" too often, Bush's claim of standing to principle
occurred in a backdrop of political expediency. Amazingly, the
one episode where Bush significantly shaped a civil rights dialogue
by personally standing up to civil rights interests is widely heralded
as Bush's greatest failure. For this reason, the Civil Rights Act of
1991 shows the necessity for a President to stake out a position.
The starting point here is Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."9
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court dramatically altered the debate
over disparate impact proofs of discrimination. Rather than de-
mand that employment practices be related to job performance,
Wards Cove concluded that "the dispositive issue is whether a chal-
lenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employ-
ment goals of the employer."12 Wards Cove also held that the
burden of persuasion "remains with the disparate-impact .plain-
tiff""' and that the plaintiff-worker had to specifically identify
the employment practice that was being challenged. 122 It was
Wards Cove and four other 1989 decisions that prompted congres-
sional leaders to push for a new civil rights bill.12' Wards Cove,
however, raised the quota issue and became the principal sticking
point in negotiations between the White House and the Congress.
A. 1990: Setting and Unsetting the Stage
On February 7, 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was intro-
duced by Edward Kennedy in the Senate and Gus Hawkins in the
House. 24  Also, on February 7, Attorney General Dick
Thornburgh said in a written statement that Wards Cove was "root-
ed in the Court's opposition to racial quotas, which we share.""
119 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
120 Id. at 659.
121 Id
122 Id. at 657.
123 The other 1989 decisions are Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The 1991 Act also over-
turned Astoria Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991); West
Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1318 (1991).
124 See 136 CONG. REc. S1018-21 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (text of S.2104 and accom-
panying remarks by Sen. Kennedy); 136 CONG. REc. H364 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (in-
troduction of H.R. 4000 and accompanying remarks by Rep. Hawkins).
125 Statement by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh (Feb. 7, 1990) (on file with au-
thor).
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The Justice Department "urged the Court to reach the deci-
sion ... it did in [Wards Cove], we agree with [it], and will op-
pose any legislation that seeks to overturn [it]. "x2 If Congress
statutorily overturns Wards Cove, then "[employers] will make sure
they have so many blacks, so many hispanics and be done with
it... [they will think] that the only safe course is to have quo-
tas."127
The administration did agree with congressional sponsors that
civil rights reform was necessary. On February 22, through Repub-
lican Senator Orin Hatch, an administration-backed bill was intro-
duced.12' The administration's proposal sought to overturn only
two of the Court cases targeted by Kennedy-Hawkins, leaving intact
Wards Cove's treatment of disparate impact cases. Congressional
sponsors did not seriously consider the White House alternative;
instead, on April 4, the Senate Labor Committee concluded that
an employer must demonstrate that employment practices which
have a disparate impact are "essential to effective job perfor-
mance."" One day earlier, on April 3, Attorney General
Thornburgh claimed that this standard places an impossible bur-
den on employers and raised the spectre of a presidential
veto.is
The President stood behind this claim. On May 17, in a Rose
Garden Ceremony welcoming his Civil Rights Commission appoint-
ees, Bush spoke out against quotas as "wrong [because] they vio-
late the most basic principles of our civil rights tradition and the
most basic principles of the promise of democracy." Although
unwilling "to sign a bill whose unintended consequences are quo-
tas," Bush spoke of the need for civil rights legislation "to
obliterate consideration of factors such as race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin from employment decisions."' "I want to sign
a civil rights bill," said Bush, "but I will not sign a quota bill."'
126 Joan Biskupic, A Bipartisan Hill Coalition Unveils Rights Measure, 48 CONG. Q. AL-
MANAC 892 (1990) (quoting Deputy Attorney General Donald Ayer).
127 Id
128 See 136 CONG. REC. S1497 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990) (introduction of S.2166).
129 S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
130 Letter from Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
Chairman, Committee on Labor and Human Resources (April 3, 1990) (on file with
author).
131 Remar*s, supra note 87, at 779.
132 Id.
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The Rose Garden speech was a telling event. On one hand,
Bush made clear his desire to work with the civil rights communi-
ty. That this speech coincided with an event designed to bridge
the Reagan-era gap between the civil rights community and the
White House bolstered Bush's conciliatory message. On the other
hand, Bush's anti-quota rhetoric cued civil rights leaders of the
need to compromise on the Wards Cove issue.
Bush's firmness on the quota issue had its effect. On the day
of his Rose Garden speech, Kennedy-Hawkins sponsors softened
their demand that employment practices be "essential to effective
job performance" with substitute language requiring employment
practices to bear a "substantial and demonstrable relationship to
effective job performance."' Two months later, Kennedy-
Hawkins was again softened. A "significant relationship," rather
than a "substantial and demonstrable relationship" would now
suffice."s Moreover, instead of allowing an employee to rest her
disparate impact claim on a group of employment practices, spon-
sors acceded to a particularity requirement prohibiting such a
general allegation whenever a court finds that identification of
specific practices is reasonably possible through examination of the
employer's records."35 Finally, the substitute added new language
providing that "nothing in . . . this Act shall be construed to re-
quire an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas. "136
These concessions did not settle the issue. Although the
White House was now willing to negotiate the terms of the statuto-
ry overturning of Wards Cove, Bush continued to speak of his de-
sire to "sign the civil rights bill of 1990 and not a quota bill of
1990." s7 The revamped Kennedy-Hawkins would not do as Bush
renewed his veto threat of this language. Instead, the White House
endorsed a substitute measure requiring employment practices to
bear a "manifest relationship" to the employment in question and
that the employee has the burden of identifying specific employ-
ment practices which contributed to the disparate impact. 38
133 See H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 97 (1990); Joan Biskupic,
Bush Shifts on Joh-Rights Bill But Differences Remain, 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1563 (1990).
134 See 136 CONG. REC. S9325-27 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (text of Kennedy-Jeffords
substitute).
135 Id. at S9325.
136 L
137 EASrLAND, supra note 2, at 341 n.4 (July 1990 remarks to National Council of La
Raza).
138 For the text of the Michel-LaFonlce substitute, see 136 CONG. REc. H6746-47
(daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990). For the President's letter supporting this measure, see id. at
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Negotiations among administration officials, the civil rights
community, and congressional sponsors of the bill, which took
place over several weeks during the summer, were unable to over-
come this impasse. Although negotiations nearly succeeded, the
resolution of the Wards Cove issue ultimately proved impossi-
ble."3 9 The key here was not President Bush's principled objec-
tion to either numerical measures of discrimination or quotas. The
President's civil rights record was already mired in inconsistency
on these very matters.
Like other civil rights matters, the President's practice was to
delegate to his appointees and-if necessary--engage in damage
control. The President then stood firm because his negotiating-
team included his counsel C. Boyden Gray and Department of
Justice officials who strongly backed Wards Cove. The only member
on the administration team without a strong interest in the preser-
vation of Wards Cove was Chief of Staff John Sunnunu. Had
Sunnunu controlled the negotiations a deal may well have been
struck. According to one account, within hours of Kennedy and
Sunnunu agreeing to a compromise, C. Boyden Gray submitted a
conflicting offer." Another account, however, suggests that Ken-
nedy backed away from his agreement with Sunnunu after being
pressured by civil rights interests. 41 Irrespective of which of
these accounts is accurate, it is nevertheless true that although the
President's desire to work things out with civil rights interests had
placed Wards Cove squarely on the bargaining block, the White
House team proved stingy in their negotiations.
On September 25, House and Senate conferees agreed to file
a conference report quite close to the softened Kennedy-
Hawkins. 142 Attorney General Thornburgh, in a letter dated Oc-
tober 12, indicated that the President "will be compelled to veto"
the bill.43  "As we have repeatedly pointed out," said
Thornburgh, "the trouble with the bill is that it will inevitably
result in quotas being adopted surreptitiously to avoid the cost
H6747-48.
139 See Joan Biskupic, Deal on Civil Rights Measure Stymied by 'Qiota' Issue, 48 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 2225 (1990).
140 See Joan Biskupic, Partisan Rancor Marks Vote on Civil Rights Measure, 48 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 2312 (1990).
141 See id.
142 H.R. REP. No. 755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
143 Letter from Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to Senator Robert Dole, Minority
Leader (Oct. 12, 1990) (on file with author).
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and trouble of disparate impact lawsuits."'" When the confer-
ence report was passed by the Senate on October 16, and the
House on October 17, a presidential veto seemed certain. On
October 14, however, President Bush, following a phone conversa-
tion with Vernon Jordan, ordered his negotiating team to meet
with Jordan and William Coleman on October 16.14' The Presi-
dent wanted to compromise. Sunnunu, who recently had been
embarrassed by his mismanagement of the 1990 budget summit,
was also determined to reach an accord."46
The Coleman-Jordan meeting proved a "disaster," however.
Gray and Thornburgh, apparently, would not give in.147 And why
should they? The President had committed himself to vetoing a
"quota bill" and the definition of whether the 1990 Act constituted
a "quota bill" was in their hands. While the President may have
preferred their concluding otherwise, Bush demanded only that
the meeting take place. Bush's willingness to hold his position on
Wards Cove was influenced by his having not only the votes in
Congress to sustain the veto but also the pressure from Republi-
cans who voted against the bill in anticipation of a White House
veto. Bush also wanted to keep faith with conservatives who both
strongly opposed the bill and doubted his commitment to their
agenda. Put simply: Bush felt he would be better positioned by
vetoing a "quota bill" than by signing controversial civil rights
legislation.
On October 22, the President, as he had promised, vetoed
the 1990 Civil Rights Act.1 48 On October 24, the Senate, by a
vote of 34-66, sustained the veto. 49
In his veto message, Bush devoted the bulk of his justification
to Wards Cove. Claiming that "the bill actually employs a maze of
highly legalistic language to introduce the destructive force of
quotas into our Nation's employment system" and that "[ilt is
neither fair nor sensible to give the employers of our country a
144 Id
145 See Andrew Rosenthal, Civil Rights Bill Gives Look at MWite House Split, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1990, at A15.
146 According to one source: "If the President wants a civil rights bill pretty bad,
then Sunnunu wants one real bad. If the President wants a civil rights bill real bad, then
Sunnunu is willing to play in traffic to get one." Id
147 It is possible that Gray and Thornburgh were mistakenly under the impression
that Coleman and Jordan were prepared to accede to White House demands.
148 Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
2 PUB. PAPERs 1437 (Oct. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Message to the Senate].
149 136 CONG. REC. S16,562-02, S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
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difficult choice between using quotas and seeking a clarification of
the law through costly and very risky litigation," Bush concluded
that "equal opportunity is not advanced but thwarted."'
This high sounding rhetoric was quickly called into question.
Legislation that Bush sent to Congress contemporaneously with his
veto was surprisingly similar to the legislation he vetoed on the
Wards Cove issue. With respect to employment practices that are
defended as a measure of job performance, for example, both
bills defined business necessity as practices which "bear a signifi-
cant relationship to successful job performance," placed the bur-
den of persuasion regarding business necessity on employers, and
allowed employees to challenge a group of employment practices
when they are unable to demonstrate that a particular employ-
ment practice causes disparate impact because "elements of a deci-
sion-making process are not capable of separation." 1 ' Inconsis-
tencies between the Bush veto message as well as an accompanying
Attorney General analysis 52 are so stark that it appears that one
set of White House interests (Gray and Thornburgh) controlled
the veto message and another set (possibly Sunnunu) the pro-
posed legislation. This, of course, is not to say that there were no
differences of substance between the two measures. Significant
differences did exist on punitive damages, the right to a jury trial,
and nonparty rights to challenge court-approved settlement agree-
ments."' The administration's proposal, moreover, by extending
its coverage to court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, and con-
ciliation agreements raised doubts about Executive Order 11,246
as well as voluntary affirmative action programs that courts had
found outside the bounds of Title VII.1' These differences,
while significant, do not explain how a veto message rooted in
disparate impact proofs and quotas can be reconciled with similar
language in the White House alternative.
150 Message to the Senate, supra note 148, at 1438.
151 Compar §§ 3 & 4 of the Bush bill, discussed surm note 128 wh §§ 3 & 4 of
1990 Act, supra note 124. The Bush bill, however, embraced a more lenient definition of
business necessity ("significant relationship to a significant business practice") in the case
of other employment practices. See § 3 of the Bush bill, supra note 128.
152 See Memorandum from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General to the President on
the Civil Rights Act of 1990 (Oct. 22, 1990).
153 See Significant Diffmnces Rdain Betueen Vetoed Civil Rights Bill and White House Pro-
posal, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at C-1 (Nov. 5, 1990).
154 See id.
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The notion that Bush held strong personal views about quotas
in employment does not explain the 1990 Act veto. Indeed, within
weeks of his veto, Bush spoke passionately of his belief for race-
based scholarships. Ironically, the Bush appointee responsible for
the minority scholarship flap, Michael Williams, mistakenly under-
stood Bush's antiquota rhetoric as a White House signal to do
away with race-based scholarships.155 At that time, however, Bush
was probably more interested in mending fences with those civil
rights interests who were disappointed by his veto.
Bush's positioning on the 1990 Civil Rights Act--even if unin-
tentional-proved a political windfall. By labelling the civil rights
bill a "quota bill," Bush maximized political advantage, standing
tall in the face of minority group pressure while speaking of ex-
panding guarantees of equal opportunity and eliminating preju-
dice in the workplace." Indeed, the civil rights veto proved a
political bonanza for the President.5 7 Party spokesman Charles
Black depicted the quota issue as a "'very salient,'" "'galvanizing
issue among core Republicans and conservative Democrats.'""58
Furthermore, by making the enactment of civil rights legislation
one of his 1991 domestic priorities, Bush sought both to take the
moral high ground and to control the debate on this volatile
issue.
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
No time was wasted in efforts to enact a civil rights bill in
1991. On January 3, Representative Jack Brooks introduced H.R.
1V5 9 and thus commenced the saga of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Like deja vu, the bill proceeded in a parallel universe to its 1990
predecessor-including legislative compromises, anti-quota rhetoric,
veto threats, and marathon summer negotiations. History did not
repeat itself, however. Late appearing and unforeseen changes in
the political climate transformed gridlock into an eleventh hour
agreement. Throughout this episode, including the decisive last
minute negotiations, the Bush White House held firm on congres-
sional efforts to replace Wards Cove with an explicit statutory stan-
155 See Paul A. Gigot, One Man's Met Proved by Muddle in White House, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 21, 1990, at A10.
156 Message to the Senate, supra note 148, at 1438.
157 Fred Barnes, The Race Card, NEW REPUBjC, Dec. 17, 1990, at 10.
158 Id.
159 H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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dard. Whether these presidential efforts ranked a significant legis-
lative compromise or a resounding political defeat is another mat-
ter.
H.R. 1, on the disparate impact issue, lifted the standard used
in the vetoed 1990 Act. Not surprisingly, the White House rejected
this approach out of hand. In fact, the administration continued
to claim that Wards Cove should not be overturned. Pointing to
post Wards Cove cases, Assistant Attorney General John Dunne told
Congress in February that these cases "demonstrate that legitimate
disparate impact claims can still be brought and won."1" Dunne
also reminded Congress of Bush's successful 1990 veto, noting that
the administration "would not accept a bill that results in quotas
or other unfair preferences."'
On March 12, the Bush administration introduced its own
civil rights legislation. Gone were the compromises contained in
the legislation transmitted with the President's veto proposal. Argu-
ing that proof of employment discrimination sensitive to numerical
imbalance creates a very real risk of quotas, the White House
endorsed the inclusion of stringent evidentiary safeguards to dis-
courage hiring by numbers. The Bush bill, for example, forbade
employers who use ability tests from adjusting test scores or using
different cut-offs for members of different groups. 62 Moreover,
the bill imposed a strict specificity standard, demanding that an
employee "demonstrates that a particular employment practice
causes a disparate impact,"" and allowed employers to escape
liability by demonstrating "business necessity," so long as the al-
leged practice advances "legitimate employment goals.""6 Only on
the noncontroversial burden of proof issue, where the White
House bill placed the burden on the employer, was the adminis-
tration willing to overrule Wards Cove." Bush's position here was
a marked departure from his earlier willingness to allow excep-
tions to the "particular employment practice" demand and to
160 Hearings on H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Before the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 545 (1991) (memorandum for the Attorney Gener-
al).
161 Statement of Assistant Attorney General John Dunne Before House Judiciary Subcomm. on
Civil Rights on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (H.R. 1), Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at F-1
(Feb. 8, 1991).
162 H.R. 1375, S. 611, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
163 IL § 4(k) (emphasis added).
164 Id. § 3(n) (emphasis added).
165 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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require employers to demonstrate that hiring practices are signifi-
cantly related to "successful job performance." 166
The battle lines drawn between the President and Congress
were hardly surprising. Congressional civil rights advocates ad-
vanced a bill that nearly overrode Bush's veto and hoped for the
best. Bush, in contrast, was less willing to compromise. He and his
spokesmen also turned up the familiar anti-quota rhetoric. Attor-
ney General Thornburgh said the administration bill would en-
courage employers to "provide equal opportunity for all workers
without resorting to quotas or other unfair preferences."' 67 Bush
also echoed this familiar refrain. "I am not going to sign a bill
that will foster quotas, directly or indirectly," said Bush, "the small
employer [must not be driven] into a state of frenzy because of
fearing mindless legislative action against him.""6 Bush had good
reason to pound this theme; his veto had proven politically popu-
lar and there was reason to think it had taken some wind out of
bill sponsors' sails. Bush's new found bravado, according to press
accounts, was also revealed in his alleged pressuring of business
leaders who sought a compromise on H.R. 1 independent of the
White House."6 This hardball tactic, as one observer put it, en-
sured that "if a bill is to pass [in 1991], it will only be through a
deal with President Bush."17 1
H.R. 1 sponsors recognized the power of the administration's
rhetorical advances. Ralph Neas, director of the Leadership Con-
ference on Civil Rights and target of presidential rebuke, be-
moaned that "the overwhelming concern [in Congress] has been
the quota issue, much more politically than substantively."17 1 To
shore up legislative support, and a realistic veto override threat,
H.R. 1, in late May, was amended. The amendment limited some
punitive damages awards; more significant, business necessity was
166 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
167 Wite House Civil Rights Bill Would Expand Harassment Awards, But Reject Jury Option,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at A-4 (Mar. 5, 1991) (citing a letter Thomburgh sent to
congressional leaders accompanying the administration's bill).
168 Remarks to the National Retail Federation, I PUB. PAPERS 549, 551 (May 23,
1991).
169 Joan Biskupic, Job Discrimination Legislation Roils Business Community, 49 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 989 (1991).
170 Joan Biskupic, With Business Talks Stalled, Bush Holds Best Hand, 49 CONG. Q. AL-
MANAc 1063 (1991).
171 Joan Biskupic, Democrats Scramble for Cover Under GOP 'Quota' Altacks, 49 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 1378 (1991) (quoting Ralph G. Neas, Director of the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights).
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moderated to "a significant and manifest relationship to the re-
quirements of effective job performance" and the specificity re-
quirement was reinstated unless a court concludes that, "after
diligent effort," the specific practices cannot be isolated from the
group.17 12 The amended bill, finally retained language specifying
that the amendments should not be construed "to require, encour-
age, or permit... quotas. "17s
The White House flatly rejected the amended H.R. 1.
Thornburgh depicted the bill as "a hoax" and said it "excludes
from the definition of quotas the only kind of quotas... already
in existence."1 4 "Nothing has changed," warned the Attorney
General, "[tihe president will veto any legislation which has under-
gone only cosmetic changes and which still forces quotas. " '7s
President Bush likewise attacked the bill as the "road to lawsuits
and discord," for "[e]ven the section that supposedly outlaws quo-
tas endorses quotas. " 17  "[I]t's a quota bill, regardless of how its
authors dress it up. You can't put a sign on a pig and say it's a
horse."' 7 Lamenting his inability to compromise and the short
shrift given his alternative (which would "encourage people to
work together, rather than employing quotas"), Bush criticized
"[tihe beltway interest groups and their spokespersons [for want-
ing] to make me accept or veto a quota bill."7'
On June 5, the amended H.R. 1 passed the House by a vote
of 273-158, a slightly narrower margin than the 1990 Act and
fifteen short of a veto proof majority.'7 9 Noting that "the num-
ber of votes in opposition ... indicates strong support for sustain-
ing a Presidential veto," the White House, not H.R. 1 sponsors,
claimed "grati[tude]" and victory by the House vote."
172 H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(o)(1), 102(k)(b), 106 (1991) (as amended
on June 5, 1991).
173 Id. § 111.
174 Three Verrions of Civil Rights Reform Will Be Considered By House Next Week Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 105, at A-5 (May 31, 1991).
175 Id.
176 Remarks at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy Commencement in
Quantico, Virginia, 1 PUB. PAPERS 581, 583 (May 30, 1991).
177 Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in
West Point, New York, 1 PUB. PAPERS 589, 591-92 (June 1, 1991).
178 Remarks to the National Federation of Independent Business, 1 PUB. PAPERS 596,
598 (June 3, 1991).
179 Legislative Profile Report (102d Congress) (Lexis, Legis Library, Cngvot file).
180 See Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Civil Rights Legislation, 1 PUB. PA
PERS 613, 613 Uune 5, 1991).
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Enter John Danforth, a Republican Senator from Missouri.
Danforth introduced compromise legislation in June which went
over like a lead balloon with the administration. By defining busi-
ness necessity as "a manifest relationship to the requirements for
effective job performance,""' EEOC chairman Kemp informed
Chief of Staff Sunnunu that employers would "have little choice
but to revert to [quotas]"182 and Attorney General Thornburgh
chided Danforth for demanding more than the "established" legal
standard of "manifest .relationship to the employment in ques-
tion."' In September, Danforth tried again. This time borrow-
ing language from the Bush-supported Americans with Disabilities
Act.' The White House, although somewhat receptive to bor-
rowing from the ADA, rejected this effort."s Press Secretary Mar-
lin Fitzwater depicted Danforth's latest compromise as an invita-
tion to quotas and the OMB issued a statement of administration
policy savaging the bill as a "quota bill" and noting that the
President's "senior advisers would recommend a veto."1 86 The
use of the Disabilities Act language was considered irrelevant, both
because that law treats "'business necessity' as an undefined term"
and because the Danforth compromise limits nonparty rights to
challenge "quotas" contained in extant content decrees.8 7
At summer's end, the prospects for compromise seemed
bleak. Bush, buoyed by the House vote, held to his position. In a
series of speeches, moreover, Bush also made clear that it was the
"lawyers" in his administration-Dick Thornburgh and C. Boyden
Gray-who were defining administration policy on the 1991 Act.
In explaining his objections to the amended H.R. 1, Bush-who
had earlier and proudly declared his ignorance on legal mat-
ters-emphasized that "[a]s far as our experts can tell.., the
changes that they're proposing are strictly cosmetic."188 When
181 S. 1208, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
182 Administration Officials Target Moderate Republican Civil Rights Bil Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 124, at A-15 (Jun. 27, 1991).
183 Text of Letter from Attorney General Thornburgh to Sen. Danforth, Jun. 21, 1991, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 124, at E-1 (Jun. 27, 1991).
184 EEOC Chairman Criticizes Danforth Proposal to Link Language of Civil Right, ADA Act,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-12 (Sep. 24, 1991) (draft version of S. 1745).
185 The administration viewed their own proposal as the only framework within which
to incorporate the ADA language. See White House Trades Charges with Danforth,. Conserv-
tives Tinker with Administration BiA!, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 187, at A-6 (Sept. 26,
1991).
186 Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1745 October 23, 1991, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 206, at F-1 (Oct. 24, 1991).
187 Id.
188 Remarks to the National Retail Federation, 1 PuB. PAPERs 549, 551 (May 23,
[Vol. 68:955
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER BUSH
Danforth introduced compromise legislation a few weeks later, the
President remarked in an exchange with reporters that "[olur
attorneys and the Attorney General are looking at it.""' Corre-
spondingly, when he opposed the original Danforth compromise,
Bush remarked "don't inflict the American people with something
that inevitably, in the opinion of the Attorney General, our own
counsel... lead[s] to quotas.""g Finally, in explaining his views
on a further modified Danforth compromise, Bush simply referred
to "the Attorney General's opinions."' With Thornburgh and
Gray having led the veto charge in 1990, the prospects of another
presidential veto loomed as late as October 23, the date of the
OMB statement.
The very next day, however, "marathon negotiations" resulted
in a compromise that the President proclaimed he would "enthusi-
astically sign."19 2 "It does not resort to quotas, and it strengthens
the cause of equality in the workplace," said Bush.193 The key to
the compromise was the bill's failure to conclusively define busi-
ness necessity. Instead, by reference to an interpretive memo, the
1991 Act said that judicial interpretation of "business necessity"
should be governed by the "concepts enunciated by. . . Supreme
Court... decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio." 94 The compromise also included concessions from both
sides on specificity and damage awards as well as broad conces-
sions from bill sponsors on attorney fees and from the White
House on nonparty challenges to consent decrees, punitive damag-
es, and the availability of jury trials.195
1991).
189 Exchange with Reporters Aboard Air Force One, 1 PUB. PAPERS 657, 657 (June
14, 1991).
190 Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 694, 695 (June 19, 1991).
191 The President's News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1013, 1017 (Aug. 2, 1991).
192 The President's News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1328, 1328 (Oct. 25, 1991).
193 Id.
194 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991),
referring to 137 CONG. REC. S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (interpretive memorandum
as introduced by Sen. Danforth) (citation omitted).
195 On the issue of damage awards, the Act allows victims of intentional dis-
crimination to recover compensatory and punitive damages in addition to relief already
available under existing legislation. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, § 102,
105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991). In addition, the Act limits damage awards, although not to
the levels the Bush Administration sought. Id On the issue of specificity, the Act requires
a complainant to demonstrate the specific practice or practices that caused the disparate
impact. The Act does provide an exception if the worker "can demonstrate to the court
that the elements of a [company's] decisionmaking process are not capable of separation
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Why did the White House team, after nearly two years of
steadfast opposition to a compromise civil rights measure, agree to
this arrangement? One account sees Bush as politically expedient,
someone who never cared about the quota issue and, consequent-
ly, quite willing to shift his stance once it appeared his hard line
position was politically iinpopular. This recounting places great
weight on two October 1991 events that may well have changed
popular perceptions of a second Bush veto.1 6 On October 11-13,
Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment against Supreme
Court nominee Clarence Thomas played out before the nation.
On October 19, former Ku Klux Klansman and reborn Republican
David Duke became one of two candidates who would participate
in a November run-off election for governor of Louisiana. The
emergence of the Hill-Thomas and Duke controversies clearly
raised the symbolic stakes of a Bush veto. Given Bush's erratic
track record on civil rights and his apparent desire to place politi-
cal popularity ahead of a principled vision, it is not inappropriate
to conclude that the October 24 compromise was a political capit-
ulation. Under this view, compromises made by bill sponsors were
an unimportant bone tossed the President's way so that he could
try to save some face.
A more charitable interpretation of the October 24 compro-
mise was that the Bush team was politically pragmatic. The Hill-
Thomas and Duke episodes affected not only popular opinion but
congressional votes. On October 23, two Republican Senators that
Bush counted on to sustain his veto, John Warner of Virginia and
Ted Stevens of Alaska, informed the President that they might not
support him in a veto override fight. 97 With fears of his coali-
tion collapsing, Bush was compelled to strike a deal with bill sup-
porters.
The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. The Octo-
ber 23 OMB memo suggests that-even after Hill-Thomas and
Duke-there was some fight in the administration. That is not to
say that the President-whose earlier efforts at compromise with
William Coleman and Vernon Jordan suggest-did not want to
for analysis." Id. § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074. Contrary to Bush proposals, the Act both allows
for jury trials and limits nonparty rights. Id. §§ 102(c), 108, 105 Stat. at 1076.
196 Pamela Fessler, Rights Bill Rises From the Ashes of Senate's Thomas Fight, 49 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 3093, 3124 (1991).
197 I. On the relationship between White House-Congress negotiations and the pros-
pects of a veto override, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Reneging on Histo? Playing the
CourftCongress/Prsident Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
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reach an accord with the civil rights community and sign reform
legislation. Indeed, on October 18 (after Hill-Thomas but before
Duke's October 19 second place finish in Louisiana's gubernatorial
primary), Bush is reported to have "strongly expressed" to Gray
and others his desire to sign a bill.' With Duke's electoral suc-
cess and the communiques from Stevens and Warner, that strong
expression was more likely to spur a legislative compromise. At the
same time, the President was not willing to completely give in to
the other side. He would not, for example, sign a bill that he had
previously characterized as a quota bill. With Gray and
Thornburgh on the President's negotiating team and with the veto
override too close to call, bill sponsors needed to take into ac-
count the possible failure of compromise and ultimate defeat in
an override battle.
The stage was then set for successful negotiations. Although
the bargaining power of the Bush team was severely compromised,
civil rights supporters were too vulnerable to disregard the threat
of a presidential veto. The peculiar solution was the endorsement
of language so devoid of meaning that both sides could claim
victory. Supreme Court decisions pre-dating Wards Cove had alter-
natively embraced both the White House proposal ("manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question") and the original H.R. 1
("significantly related to job performance").'
What courts would do in the future was a calculated risk for
both sides. The White House team hoped that a 1992 Bush victory
would keep DOJ and EEOC interpretations in their corner as well
as ensure a further strengthening of a judiciary principally con-
trolled by Reagan and Bush appointees. With some luck, the
courts might well settle on an interpretation of disparate impact
proofs quite close to Wards Cove. Civil rights interests, needless to
say, hoped that courts would take' a skeptical view of the
President's post-hoc propaganda campaign and, instead, pay at-
tention to their own post-hoc propaganda campaign.
Bill supporters, however, did not place much stock on the
expectation that a Democrat would win the White House and
advance an expansive view of disparate impact proofs through DOJ
198 See Ann Devroy, Bush Saw Gains in Dea, Oicials Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1991,
at Al.
199 Both of these standards are contained in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), the Supreme Court's leading disparate impact decision prior to Wards Cov See
G i&g 401 U.S. at 426 ("significantly related"); i4. at 432 ("manifest relationship").
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and EEOC litigation. Had civil rights interests perceived that Bush
would lose the 1992 elections, it is unlikely that they would have
compromised on disparate impact standards or attorney fees. In-
stead, they would have risked an unsuccessful veto override know-
ing that a Democratic President would likely back the original
H.R. 1 package. In the fall of 1991, however, it was unreasonable
to expect either the fall of Bush or the ascendancy of Clinton.
On November 21, the President signed the Civil Rights Act of
1991. While proudly proclaiming that his leadership resulted in a
law that "will not lead to quotas, which are inconsistent with equal
opportunity and merit-based hiring; nor does it create incentives
for needless litigation,"' the day was a bittersweet one for Bush.
His anti-quota stance, in many respects, hinged on his assertion
that Wards Cove was only overturned insofar as the new law shifted
the burden of persuasion from employee to employer and that an
interpretive memorandum prepared by Senate minority leader
Robert Dole be treated as "authoritative interpretive guidance by
all officials in the executive branch.""' The Dole memo, howev-
er, was no more than a floor statement advancing one plausible
interpretation of the statute. Bush's interpretation of the
legislation's explicit overturning of Wards Cove, moreover, was at
least highly speculative.
The ceremony was bittersweet for other reasons. Several Dem-
ocratic sponsors of the law and civil right groups boycotted the
signing ceremony in protest of a draft signing statement which
called for the elimination of federal affirmative action programs
"that may be inconsistent with the new law or with the principle
of discouraging quotas and unfair preferences."0 2 The President
distanced himself from the proposed signing statement and pro-
claimed his support of affirmative action.' The signing state-
ment episode, however, once again demonstrated the President's
lack of conviction and leadership. He was again left with egg on
200 Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1504, 1504
(Nov. 21, 1991).
201 Id. at 1702 (referring to 137 CONG. REC. S 15,472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)).
Dole's memo asserted that "the bill is no longer designed to overrule the meaning of
business necessity in Wards Cove" Id. at S15,475. Bush also used his signing statement to
direct federal agencies to treat the Act as having only prospective, not retroactive, force.
See Dispute Over Retroaciviy of Civil Rights Ad Stems from Legislative His", Hill Staffer Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-13 (Jan. 22, 1992).
202 Draft Signing Statement, rerinted in AMERICAN LAW INSTrUTE, THE CmL RiGHTS
ACT OF 1991 317 (1992).
203 See William Raspberry, Bush's Missing Drummer, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1991, at A21.
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his face as both civil rights and conservative interests defiled his
lack of vision and courage.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act is generally considered a policy
debacle for the Bush White House. Aside from the signing state-
ment fiasco and the legislative proposal Bush sent Congress with
his 1990 veto, however, administration policy was quite consistent
and clearly effective. No doubt, the White House retreated quite a
bit from its original position. But so did congressional backers,
especially when one considers the original Kennedy-Hawkins' pro-
posal. Had it not been for growing fears of a successful veto over-
ride, moreover, it is quite possible that Bush would have refused
to agree to many of the concessions he made-and again vetoed
the 1991 Act.
That no one describes Bush's conduct here as political prag-
matism is itself revealing. In the end, the President lost the battle
over symbols and, given the vacuousness of his civil rights policy,
symbols were all he had. That his hard line negotiators may have
both kept his policy fairly consistent and secured something more
than a pyrrhic victory did not matter. His last minute compromise
seemed a complete capitulation because his anti-quota rhetoric was
obviously self-contradictory and self-serving. On too many occasions
the President had made the politically expedient choice, making it
difficult to view his 1991 Act compromise as something other than
a political sellout.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE
COUNTER-ADVOCACY
Twelve years of Republican rule accomplished very little in the
disassembly of group-conscious goals and timetable as well as nu-
merical proofs of discrimination. If anything, the evolution of
judicial doctrine, statutory language, and agency regulation has not
dented group-conscious approaches. What explains this state of
affairs? Are group-conscious approaches so entrenched that White
House opposition was doomed to failure? Alternatively, did Reagan
and Bush secretly support group-conscious approaches so that the
current state of affairs actually matches White House preferences?
Both of these propositions are not without force. Reagan's eventu-
al support of the 1982 voting rights reforms as well as his refusal
to rescind Executive Order 11,246 are in part explained by wide-
spread support for both measures. White House support of
preferences is evidenced by Bush's position on minority set-asides
1993]
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and race-exclusive scholarships as well as his appointments to the
FCC, Civil Rights Commission, and other government agencies.
The current state of affairs is also-and I believe more funda-
mentally-explained by the political failures of the Reagan and
Bush administrations. The Reagan White House impeded its own
effectiveness by taking a too confrontational, too ideological stance
on such issues as the private school tax-exemption controversy and
the Civil Rights Commission. Reagan's ability to constructively
participate on voting rights reform, revisions to Executive Order
11,246, and the like were hampered by these initiatives. The Bush
White House's failings were the flip-side of this coin. Rather than
seeing-as one Bush White House official put it-the Reagan era
as "a valiant effort not done right, the opposite lesson was taken,
which was: Let's not engage on civil rights . . . let's not stake out
a principled view. "2M The consequence of the purposeful ab-
sence of leadership, not surprisingly, was a failed presidency (on
civil rights at least). Bush simply did not understand that civil
rights policymaking implicates fundamental moral concerns so that
it is necessary for a President to have some position on questions
of numerical proofs of discrimination as well as on race and gen-
der preferences. It cost the Bush administration dearly that it did
not figure out "that the American public would welcome vigorous,
principled leadership on this increasingly bitter front."205
What then should Presidents do? The Reagan EEOC, I think,
provides an answer of sorts. Clarence Thomas, by understanding
that having a civil rights vision does not mean acting on it at all
times, accomplished a lot. Through resource prioritization, agency
reorganization, and refusing to discover new vistas in the law, the
Reagan EEOC adeptly advanced an individual-centered approach
towards civil rights enforcement. Admittedly, by not directly chal-
lenging disfavored approaches, the EEOC kept on the books regu-
lations that it disliked. This approach, however, does not concede
complete incoherence in governmental decisionmaking nor does it
evidence a refusal to lead by ducking politically costly approaches.
Rather, the Reagan EEOC model offers the greatest likelihood of
enduring presidential leadership.
Let me explain. Clarence Thomas sought to re-shape the civil
rights debate by advocating an individual-centered approach and
putting, that advocacy into practice through new agency initia-
204 Marcus, supra note 13, at A20.
205 Finn, supra note 15, at 23.
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tives. ' Thomas also criticized the pre-existing group-conscious
regime.2°7 This dual advocacy offered the best opportunity for
diminishing resistance to the dismantling of group-conscious ap-
proaches and replacing them with individual-centered programs
that are already in place and are effective. This proposition, admit-
tedly, is difficult to prove. Yet, the clear failure of confrontational
strategies suggests that-had Bush truly favored individual ap-
proaches-the Thomas model would have been a worthwhile gam-
bit.
The lessons of the EEOC are not limited to conservative Presi-
dents seeking to swim against a prevailing liberal current. Bill
Clinton too can make good use of the lessons of the past twelve
years. These lessons, in no particular order, are: (1) Be careful in
picking fights with Congress and its constituents; (2) Bureaucratic
approaches such as resource prioritization and agency reorganiza-
tion may advance policy objectives without risking costly political
battles; (3) Stand for something; and (4) Expect some inconsisten-
cies in the civil rights approaches taken by the White House and
governmental agencies. By viewing civil rights as the "art of the
possible," a President can effectively affect government
decisionmaking on this volatile issue.
206 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
207 See supn note 35 and accompanying text.
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